This paper presents a model of a small open economy with a unionised nontraded sector. It provides an equilibrium in which there can be unemployment, and focuses on the effect of macroeconomic policy on the level of unemployment and social welfare. Most of open-economy macroeconomics has tended to concentrate on economies with perfectly competitive labour markets. Notable exceptions include models of fixed-price temporary equilibria (Dixit (I978), Neary (I980), and more recently Rankin (I987) inter alia).
This paper considers an economy which consists of a traded-goods sector, a non-traded goods sector, and possibly a public sector. In the traded-goods sector there are perfectly competitive labour and product markets. In the nontraded goods sector there is a competitive product market with a unionised labour market, and the public sector employs households in public works. As is common in the literature (e.g. Neary, I980), we will abstract from the distinction between traded goods which are net exports and net imports, and simply have a single traded good that can either be exported or consumed domestically.
Households have one unit of labour, and are allocated ex ante to either the traded or non-traded sector. Public-sector employees are recruited from those allocated to the non-trade sector. The number of households in the private sectors is assumed for simplicity to be the same, H. The immobility of labour between the traded and non-traded sectors is crucial for the model: with a competitive labour market in the traded sector (and perfect mobility) there might be no equilibrium unemployment.
Households have a fixed disutility of labour -0 in the non-traded sector, 6T in the traded sector: for most of the paper we will simplify by assuming O' = o. Households derive utility from consuming the traded good and the non-traded good, and have preferences of the form: 8o THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [CONFERENCE Where M is nominal money balances, P is the true cost of living index for U; U is a homothetic subutility function defined over the consumption of the traded good X1' and the non-traded good X. Since preferences are homethetic we can aggregate over households, and we will deal with aggregates XT, X, M, rather than first subscripting for households. The true cost-of-living index P is taken from the expenditure function corresponding to the homothetic sub-utility function U: e(pT, p) = p(pT, p) U (where utility is normalised so that ifpT = p = p', then P = p'). Real wages are nominal wages deflated by P.
Firms in both sectors have a constant return to scale technology, with outputs normalised to be equal to employment:
where NT and N are employment in the traded and non-traded sectors, and XIT iS the output of the traded sector. Since output markets are both competitive, there are no profits, and prices equal wages:
() Government expenditure can take two forms: employment, or direct expenditure on the output of non-traded goods. In Section II we will deal with the former case, the latter in Section III. When the government spends money on employing people on public works, these are assumed to be worthless. Public employment is assumed to have the same disutility of labour as in the nontraded goods industry. For reasons of reality and convenience, government expenditure G is measured in nominal terms (see Dixon (i 988 b) for a discussion). The nominal wage the government pays its employees is wG, so that total public employment g is:
We will not specify the nature of public-sector pay determination: rather, we will assume that the public real wage is some mark-up over the disutility of labour. Whilst the mark-up can be set at any level, for notational convenience Having outlined the basic assumptions, we will now specify the equilibrium in each sector. In the traded-goods sector, the price of the output is determined in international markets at p* in foreign currency. The exchange rate is e, so that the law of one price dictates that the domestic price is: pT = ep*.
(7)
Since the product market is competitive, with constant returns to scale, all income in the traded sector is labour income, so from (4) and (7) 
To derive the equilibrium in the non-traded sector, we first solve for the demand for non-traded goods. If we define total nominal expenditure on nontraded goods K, and traded goods KT This captures the notion of comparability, although a more realistic alternative in the UK context might be to set the public real wage at the disutility of labour.
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Interpreting these equations, the marginal propensity to import is c( -ac) and the marginal propensity to consume non-tradeable output is xc. Thus (i I a, b) are standard income-expenditure equations. Given total expenditure K, and wage W, employment in the non-traded industry is:
assuming (as we will) that there is no binding employment constraint in the domestic sector as a whole: N+g < H.
In order to define equilibrium in the non-traded sector, we need to specify how wages are determined. Suppose that there are many identical industries in the non-traded sector, so that we can look at a 'representative' industry. We will adopt a 'Hartian' model of a unionised labour market (Hart, where N is given by (I2). Since preferences are homothetic, e is homogeneous of degree zero (Hod o) in pT and p. Equation (I 5) says that the equilibrium real wage in the unionised non-traded sector is a 'mark-up' on the disutility of work, the mark-up re/ (re -i) being determined by the elasticity of demand e and the number of unions r. We will also assume that there is a unique equilibrium defined by (I 5), which is true if U is Cobb-Douglas or CES.
We can now characterise the equilibrium in the non-traded sector using In effect, Proposition I states that the domestic nominal wage becomes 'pegged' to the domestic price of tradeables (ep*); or, to put it another way, the ratio w*/ep* is fixed by (I5).2 The reason why the unionised wage becomes pegged in this way is the homotheticity of preferences, so that real wages and the elasticity of demand are determined only by relative prices, independently of output/income. The pegging result of Proposition I has implications which will play a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy. Since relative prices are fixed, the expenditure shares of tradeables and non-tradeables (i -x, aC) and elasticity e are fixed.
Lastly, it will have been noted that we have ignored the labour market in the traded-goods sector. We have simply assumed that wages are determined by ep* (7 and 8). If there is a strictly positive disutility of labour (iT > o), there is also a participation constraint for the traded-sector households ep * 6 P ( 'T.
7)
The analysis is restricted to those cases where (I7) is satisfied.
II. POLICY WITH A FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE AND PUBLIC

EMPLOYMENT
Having considered the equilibrium values of domestic variables conditional upon the exchange rate, we will now introduce the external balance into the equilibrium. We assume that the government is completely passive in managing the exchange rate. Under the assumptions of the model, since money is the only asset and there is no capital market, the balance of payments reduces to the balance of trade, and the exchange rate varies so that trade balances. Since we have only one traded good, trade balances when domestic consumption equals domestic output. In nominal terms, the trade surplus S is: We assume that private-sector agents treat e as parametric, justified by the argument that they are 'small' relative to the whole economy. The government and foreign exchange markets, however, have perfect foresight, predicting the exchange rate resulting from any given macroeconomic policy. Schematically, we envisage the following sequence of events:
The Government Foreign Exchange Wages and prices chooses (G, MA, r) markets determine e* are determined domestically given e*.
With a floating exchange rate, e* becomes endogenous and can be substituted out of the reduced-form equilibrium equations for employment and unionised wages. Government policy can influence wages and employment, not only through direct demand effects but also through its effect on the exchange rate e*. Hence an increase in G or M?, or a decrease in tax-finance r, will lead to a devaluation (an increase in e). The equilibrium levels of wages, employment and real government expenditure under a floating rate are given by: 
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That the fiscal multiplier should be unity whatever the level of tax-finance r is a very strong result: that the effect of an increase in government employment on the exchange rate causes sufficient devaluation and domestic inflation to lead to constant private consumption of the non-traded good. The intuition behind the result is quite simple once it is recognised that in equilibrium relative prices are fixed. With homothetic preferences, this means that expenditure shares are in effect fixed. Thus real domestic consumption of the traded and non-traded output rises together in fixed proportions. The balance of payments equilibrium ties down consumption of the non-traded good, and hence output and employment in the non-traded good sector (as is clear from (20C)). If domestic consumption/output of the non-traded good is fixed, there is neither crowding out nor a multiplier effect: hence the unit multiplier. The reason that taxation -r has no effect on the multiplier is that r merely affects income (the relation between gross and net income), not the ratio of household expenditure and consumption across traded and non-traded goods (which depends only on relative prices).
Whilst the effect of tax-financing does not influence the size of the real fiscal multiplier, it does influence the level of equilibrium unemployment given (G, M?). The reason for this result is closely related to Proposition 2. A rise in -r given G yields lower domestic prices (the exchange rate appreciates); there is an increase in public employment. With a floating exchange rate, then, there is a very strict sense in which tax-cuts are equivalent to an expenditure increase.
Whilst the effects of fiscal policy are perhaps a little unorthodox, the effects of monetary policy are more familiar. Even in the absence of crowding out, the fiscal expansion has no welfareimproving properties: indeed, for both Rawlesian and utilitarian governments social welfare is maximised with G = o. This result stems from the combination of assuming no direct utility from government employment, and the balance of trade equilibrium, which ties down total consumption. The assumption of no direct utility of government expenditure is of course totally implausible: in the United Kingdom a large proportion of state expenditure is on health and education. However, Proposition 5 indicates that there is no macroeconomic motive for altering government expenditure: rather, the optimal level of expenditure should be chosen by microeconomic rationale.
III. FISCAL POLICY WITH DIRECT GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
In the previous section we assumed that government expenditure took the form of direct employment in the public sector. This is not unrealistic: most of central government expenditure goes on wages and salaries. However, in this section we will consider the case of direct expenditure on the output of nontradeables. This allows government expenditure to influence the real wage in the unionised non-traded sector by altering the elasticity of demand for labour. Direct government expenditure can influence the relative price of traded and non-traded goods, and hence alter oc, the share of expenditure given to nontraded goods. Since ac underlies the income-expenditure multiplier which determines nominal national income, this influence of government expenditure can be very powerful. The analysis of this section is rather more complex than in Section II. As a result, over-analysis is in a rather less general framework: See Blanchard and Kiyotaki (I987) for derivations. The treatment of o as the elasticity of demand is an approximation. It is, however, fully justified here, as agents treat the general price level as given. o can therefore be seen as the approximate or 'perceived' elasticity. 4 The analysis of fiscal policy when the government directly purchases output from the private sector has been made under a particular assumption: government demand is unit-elastic, because of 'cash limits'. We have argued that although a special case, it is perhaps not unrealistic in the United Kingdom. Another possibility would be that the government is rather like a household -it chooses a total level of expenditure, but allocated across non-traded industries with CES preferences. Thus whether an increase in G will increase (decrease) the real wage in the non-traded sector will be determined by whether it is less (more) elastic than household demand.
